The city of Nyabibwe in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was captured by members of the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group on Wednesday, February 5th, despite reports of an apparent ceasefire. With a population of just under 1 million people, the fall of Nyabibwe marks another significant advance for rebels fighting for control of the mineral-rich Eastern Congo. The DRC is said to contain 80% of the world’s cobalt, a mineral vital in the production of lithium-ion batteries. Over 100 rebel groups are in contention to control even a portion of the Kivu provinces. This development follows the capture of Goma, Northern Kivu’s provincial capital, less than a week ago.
The already dire conditions for civilians and the displaced are deteriorating rapidly. At Kyeshero Hospital in Goma, a spokesman for Doctors Without Borders told AP News that staff have been overwhelmed with displaced people seeking medical treatment and that the facility hit 200% capacity over the past few days. This crisis is compounded by past reports, as Doctors Without Borders documented that over 25,000 victims of sexual violence had been treated in 2023 alone, the majority of whom were from Goma or the surrounding area. Both the Congolese government and United Nations officials have accused Rwanda of sending nearly 4,000 troops across the border to aid the M23 rebels, which Rwandan President Paul Kagame has since denied. In a press statement on Thursday, DRC ambassador to the U.N. Paul Empole Losoko Efambe told reporters there will be a motion to establish a formal investigation into “mass violations” against the inhabitants of Goma.
While the recent fall of Nyabibwe and the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Goma have brought international attention to the conflict in the Congo, recent headlines have also cast a spotlight on the external involvement of other nations—and not just those in Africa. Last week, reports began circulating about the capture of nearly 300 foreign mercenaries following the capture of Goma, most of whom identified themselves as being from Romania.
It is not uncommon to find Europeans working for private military companies (PMCs) in Africa. In its latest print, LittleAfrica News reported on the Wagner Group—a Russian PMC now largely under the control of the Kremlin—and its growing presence in Central and West Africa. In countries like Mali and the Central African Republic, Wagner troops are being deployed to protect mines and other resource extraction sites, as well as participate in offenses against rebels and extremist groups. While members of Russia’s Africa Corps often serve as attachés to military officials and general staff, most ground troops killed while fighting on the front lines have been identified as Wagner soldiers. In exchange for military assistance, Wagner and the Kremlin receive exact payments in the form of natural resources like gold and other precious metals. This type of arrangement—known as security-resource exchange—has enabled Russian President Vladimir Putin to circumvent economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. and European Union after his invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022. Moreover, by deploying Wagner soldiers and not Russian troops, the Kremlin has been able to maintain its foothold in Africa without siphoning manpower away from the frontline in Ukraine.
In March of 2024, the Russian state news agency TASS announced a draft military agreement between the Kremlin and the Congolese government. This would add the DRC to a growing list of African states seeking to distance themselves from the West through cooperation with Russia. Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—the three nations that exited ECOWAS last month—have relied heavily on Wagner troops since expelling French forces last year. There have been reports of human rights abuses against civilians by Wagner soldiers in numerous countries—including torture, rape, and child abduction—but their presence is still preferred to that of Western Europe and America. While the Wagner Group has been linked to election meddling in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by international observers, there are no confirmed reports that their soldiers have been involved in any Congolese military operations. However, when a few hundred Romanian mercenaries were captured after the siege of Goma, many believed them to be from Russia. Reporting by the BBC would quickly confirm their true identities, as well as the group that contracted many of the men: a Romanian private military company known as Asociatia RALF.
Contrary to the shadowy and clandestine reputation the Wagner Group has cultivated, Asociatia RALF has been mostly open about its services and leadership. On its official website, the group describes itself as “an association of former Roman legionaries who activated in the French Foreign Legion”. Featured in several pictures is a bald-headed, stocky man who has been identified as Horatiu Potra, the group’s leader. Described as a “military instructor,” Potra can be seen lecturing soldiers at the front of a classroom, as well as posing with weapons outdoors. The website is no longer available.
Some have noted that Potra bears a striking resemblance to his Wagner counterpart, the late Yevgeny Prigozhin. Prigozhin was the Wagner Group’s leader and consigliere to Vladimir Putin who would ultimately lead a mutiny against the Kremlin following the decimation of his forces in the Battle of Bakhmut. He would then be exiled to Belarus and later Africa, only to be killed in a midair explosion during his return flight to Russia.
Appearance is not the only similarity Potra shares with Prigozhin. Asociatia RALF has been busy making rounds, and photos obtained from the organization’s official website show Potra with military officials from Sierra Leone, Ghana, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic. At home, Potra recently served as the personal bodyguard to the far-right, pro-Russian politician Călin Georgescu during Romania’s most recent presidential election. He garnered media attention in December of 2024 after being arrested along with twenty other men for allegedly planning to arm Georgescu supporters protesting the election results in Bucharest.
Potra’s actions on behalf of the pro-Russian presidential candidate Călin Georgescu, as well as Asociatia RALF’s operations in African countries that have been welcoming Russian military assistance, raises understandable concerns about his potential ties to Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin. Though there is no official confirmation that either Hoartiu Potra or Asociatia RALF have any direct ties to the Kremlin, he was reportedly photographed alongside the Russian ambassador to Romania, Valery Kuzmin, on Russia’s national holiday in 2023. Regardless, their presence in the Congo brings attention to the involvement of major foreign powers in the conflict. Reporting on Rwanda’s overt assistance to the M23 rebel group and Paul Kagame’s bald-faced denial of that claim is in abundance, yet coverage of how major foreign actors may have influenced the conflict has so far been lacking—save for that of the United Nations and South Africa.
Even if it is later proven that mercenaries contracted by the Congolese government are directly linked to the Kremlin, Russia’s influence in the Congo would still be dwarfed by that of China and the United States. While Russia can offer security solutions with few strings attached, China has earned a reputation as a heavyweight investor in African economies for decades now. In September of last year, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced his country’s commitment to investing $ 51 billion into African economies over the next three years.
However, an analysis published just one month later by the Hinrich Foundation, an Asian-based economic research organization, would closely examine Beijing’s purported investments and offer some sobering clarity. China’s proposal for foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa was valued at $ 53 billion, but “less than $10 billion has actually materialized in a form that could be classified in objective economic terminology as FDI.” For example, among the highest-valued FDI projects proposed was the coordinated property development of the city of Kilamba Kiaxi in Angola. Further scrutiny would reveal that the project was financed by “oil-backed loans,” with Angola shouldering most of the risk. During the course of the project, Angola was responsible for producing 10,000 barrels of oil per day as collateral for Beijing, and if the project had fallen through, they would have been left footing the bill. Stewart Paterson, a senior research fellow at the Hinrich Foundation and author of the article, noted that it was “more of an Angolan construction operation enabled by Chinese financing” than it was a joint venture.
Condition-free loans have enabled Beijing to build positive relations with developing African nations while simultaneously integrating them into its global economy. When a nation defaults on its debts or requests more time to pay, the Chinese government can forgive a multi-million dollar loan in exchange for exclusive access to a country’s resources. Beijing has been using this strategy to secure predictable returns through regular payments while also gaining leverage over strategic assets in the DRC. The U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute published an article two days after Paterson’s, claiming: “The DRC produces 80 percent of the world’s cobalt—Chinese state-owned enterprises and policy banks control 80 percent of the total output.”
Rwanda is also in debt to China from similar infrastructure projects that have been paid forward with natural resources. In 2022, Beijing forgave a $7-million debt the Rwandan government had acquired through 23 different interest-free loans. If the M23 rebel group or its Rwandan benefactors gain control of significant mining operations in the Eastern Congo, this would undoubtedly spell financial trouble for the DRC. China, meanwhile, would likely maintain secure access to those strategic minerals through its partnership with Rwanda. Regardless of how the dust settles in the Congo, China has safeguarded its interests in more ways than one.
While Beijing has cemented its foothold in the DRC and Rwanda through debt financing, the United States—under the Biden administration—has maintained a strategy focused on conditional development aid and technical assistance. According to ForeignAssistance.gov, the federal government’s official foreign aid website, the U.S. planned and appropriated nearly $ 10 billion for Sub-Saharan African countries in 2023, with $ 560 million going to the DRC and $ 150 million going to Rwanda. The majority of the funds were sourced directly from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—the same department recently gutted by the Trump administration—which has historically provided services related to public health, education, agricultural development, and capacity-building programs meant to strengthen democratic governance.
The United States has long used foreign aid to promote its values abroad. Through investments in public health and education, programs administered through USAID have helped to improve bureaucratic capacity and foster government accountability. Upon reaching certain milestones in reform, governments can gain access to more funding, albeit gradually. However, when immediate policy changes are desired, the United States has historically turned to targeted economic sanctions on individuals and specific industries to prompt rapid changes in governance. Enabled by the Global Magnitsky Act passed in 2016, sanctions can be leveled on specific persons deemed by the U.S. government to be acting against its interests, barring U.S. citizens from doing business with them and freezing any assets within the federal government’s reach.
On Friday, Reuters reported that the United States planned on using sanctions against both Congolese and Rwandan officials if the conflict did not stop. Indeed, U.S. sanctions have long served as a tool to deter misconduct in Africa’s mining sector, but these are typically leveled on private individuals or businesses accused of human rights violations or illegal extraction. One prominent example of this is the case of Israeli billionaire and mining tycoon Dan Gertler. Friend and business partner to former DRC president Joseph Kabila, Gertler has been accused of amassing his vast fortune by securing preferential mining contracts in the Congo through various government connections. Both men have denied these claims.
Gertler would find himself on the U.S. global list of sanctioned individuals in 2017. However, in the final days of the first Trump administration, BBC reports that President Trump granted Gertler some reprieve, unfreezing his U.S.-held funds for a year. This lasted until President Joe Biden took office and his administration reversed the decision shortly thereafter. Ned Price, spokesman for the U.S. State Department under Biden, claimed the sanctions were intended to “counter corruption and promote stability” in the Congo. While Gertler may receive some sanctuary again under President Trump, many in the Congo’s government continue to associate him with former president Joseph Kabila and the corruption of the prior administration, suggesting that the current government may not be so cooperative.
That being said, as the United States considers its prospects in the DRC and Rwanda, Gertler may prove a valuable wildcard in countering Chinese influence and securing access to the region’s precious minerals. Should M23 rebels or Rwanda gain control of the Eastern Congo, Gertler would find himself with new and willing business partners, as well as potential support from the U.S. president. Regardless, the United States will certainly leverage foreign aid and sanctions as a means of protecting its interests in the Congo—a proven Trump strategy.
The crisis in the Congo and the wider struggle for strategic influence in Africa signals the reemergence of Cold War-style politics in a modern context. Russia continues to rely on security-resource exchange, profiting from the unrest, to bolster its own flailing economy and compete with the U.S. and China on the world stage. Through years of deliberate economic investing and predatory lending, China has managed to economically annex swathes of entire economies in Africa, specifically in natural resource sectors. Meanwhile, the United States continues to use its economic and military might to coerce African governments into implementing Western-style reforms and strategic partnerships. As all three countries vie to secure the minerals upon which our very future will be built, Africa remains a continent saturated in foreign influence. While nations like the Congo and Rwanda are treated as staging grounds for a global economic war waged from overseas, peace and prosperity continue to elude their people.
